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Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: 
Evidence from German Soccer
*
 
Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent 
seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. 
To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theoretical and 
empirical framework in the context of European professional soccer where (incumbent) clubs 
and players sign binding contracts which are, however, frequently renegotiated when other 
clubs (entrants) want to hire the player. Because they weaken entrants in renegotiations, long 
term contracts are useful rent seeking devices for the contracting parties. From a social point 
of view, however, they lead to allocative distortions in the form of deterring efficient transfers. 
Since incumbent clubs tend to benefit more from long term contracts in renegotiations than 
players, these must be compensated ex ante by a higher wage when agreeing to a long term 
contract. Using data from the German “Bundesliga", our model predictions are broadly 
confirmed. In particular, our analysis supports the concerns expressed in the theoretical 
literature about detrimental effects of strategic contracting on allocative inefficiency. 
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Recent theoretical research has identied a variety of possibilities how contracts can be
used as rent seeking devices vis- a-vis third parties. Examples include breach penalties,
exclusivity clauses, retroactive rebates or, in the context of labor markets, long-term
contracts and non-compete clauses. As a result of such rent seeking incentives, various
forms of ineciencies may arise, for example with respect to entry decisions (Aghion and
Bolton, 1987; Chung, 1992), investment incentives (Spier and Whinston, 1995; Segal and
Whinston, 2000; Feess and Muehlheusser, 2003), or the allocation of workers (Posner,
Triantis, and Triantis, 2004).
As detailed below, the frameworks considered in these papers dier along a variety of
important dimensions, but they all share two common properties. First, while potentially
detrimental from a social point of view, the rent seeking devices are jointly benecial for
the contracting parties. Second, not only outsiders, but also some of the contracting
parties themselves may be harmed in the course of the contractual relationship and must
hence be compensated when signing the contract. For example, when a buyer is likely to
breach in the future, she might accept a sti penalty clause only when being compensated
ex ante by paying a low price.1
To the best of our knowledge, all existing research in this area is purely theoretical, and
there is no empirical evidence so far. We provide a theoretical and empirical framework to
test some of the main properties of strategic contracting models. Thereby, we consider the
context of European professional soccer where clubs and players sign binding contracts
which are, however, frequently renegotiated when other clubs want to hire the player.
We suggest that long-term contracts may serve as rent seeking devices, as the incentive
structure exhibits all the general properties described above. First, we show that long-
term contracts tend to induce an ineciently low number of player transfers. Second, in
renegotiations, the incumbent club receives a transfer fee from the new club (the entrant)
which is increasing in the remaining duration of the player's contract due to its veto
power when holding a valid contract with the player. Hence, in case of a transfer, the
1The issue of ex ante compensation is usually not explicitly analyzed in the literature when the focus
is on investment incentives which are not aected by the ex ante division of surplus (see e.g. Hart and
Moore, 1988; Spier and Whinston, 1995). The same is true for other contexts such as asset ownership
where incomplete contracting frameworks are used (see e.g. Hart and Moore, 1990; Roider, 2004).
1longer the player's remaining contract duration, the lower the entrant's payo, and the
higher thus the joint payo of the contracting parties (i.e. player and incumbent club).
Third, the player alone, however, might be worse o in renegotiations under a long-term
contract which calls for compensation ex ante in form of a higher wage in the incumbent
club.
Specically, we develop a model where a player and the incumbent club bargain over
the duration of their contract and the player's wage. After the contract is signed, a
new club may want to hire the player. Thereby, this club rst decides on acquiring
information about the player's value, and it will then trigger a renegotiation process with
the contracting parties whenever the player is more valuable in the new club. Hence,
given that renegotiation occurs, the contract terms will only aect the distribution of the
surplus, but not the transfer decision itself which is ex post ecient.2
Therefore, the social cost of long-term contracts is an ineciently low frequency of
renegotiations, because the new club reaps only part of the renegotiation surplus, while
fully covering the (privately known) cost of information acquisition. Thereby, the new
club's investment incentive is the lower, the lower its renegotiation payo. As this payo
is decreasing in the remaining duration of the player's contract with the incumbent club,
long-term contracts reduce the frequency of renegotiation. As a result, the contracting
parties are facing the following trade-o: the longer the duration of the contract, the
higher their joint renegotiation payo when a transfer occurs, but the lower the transfer
probability as the renegotiation stage is reached less often.
Our theoretical framework leads to the following predictions: First, as just pointed
out, a player's transfer probability is decreasing in the remaining duration of his current
contract which reduces allocative eciency. Second, transfer fees (i.e. the incumbent
clubs' renegotiation payo) are increasing in the remaining duration of the player's con-
tract and decreasing in the player's wage in the incumbent club. Both results are intuitive
and are driven by the impact of the initial contract terms on the veto power of the in-
cumbent club.3
2This is a standard feature of incomplete contracting models with renegotiation, see e.g. Hart and
Moore (1990), Spier and Whinston (1995), or Segal and Whinston (2000).
3Note that allocative distortions only arise when renegotiation does not occur (resulting in no transfer)
although the player would be more valuable in the new club. Because the renegotiation process itself is
ecient, a transfer is never agreed upon when the player is more valuable in the incumbent club.
2Third, a player's wage in his new club (i.e. his renegotiation payo) is increasing in
his wage in the incumbent club, but ambiguous in the remaining duration of his initial
contract. The rst property is again intuitive, and the second result is due to the fact
that a player may benet from a long remaining contract duration when his wage in the
incumbent club is suciently high.
Regardless of whether the player or not benets in renegotiations, our fourth result is
that the joint renegotiation payo of the incumbent club and the player (i.e. transfer fee
plus wage in the new club), is increasing in the remaining duration of the player's initial
contract. This conrms the role of contract durations as rent seeking devices.
Fifth, when a player is ex post harmed by long term contracts or benets less in the
renegotiation process than the incumbent club, then he is compensated ex ante by the
incumbent club by receiving a higher wage.
To test our results, we have compiled a data set from Germany's top professional soc-
cer league (\Bundesliga"). All in all, we have information about 543 contracts including
duration and (base) wages, player specic data such as performance, position and experi-
ence, and team specic data such as nal league position and budgets. To test the impact
of remaining contract durations on transfer probabilities, we estimate a multinomial logit
model where, at the end of each season, players may either change clubs, re-new their
contracts with their current clubs or have no contract change at all. We nd that on
average, one additional remaining contract year reduces the probability of a transfer by
about 30 percent which clearly supports the view of contract durations aecting player
mobility.
Our predictions about renegotiation payos are also broadly supported by data: First,
one additional year of remaining contract duration increases the average transfer fee
by about 120 percent. Second, a player's wage in his new club is increasing in the
wage in his previous club. Third, we do not nd a signicant impact of the remaining
duration of the player's previous which is consistent with the ambiguity derived in the
theoretical framework. Fourth, one more year of remaining contract duration increases
the joint renegotiation payo of a player and his old club by more than 50 percent which
suggests that long term contracts are indeed useful rent seeking devices. Finally, we nd
that incumbent clubs indeed benet more from long term contract than players which,
according to our theory, calls for player compensation in form of a higher wage in the
3incumbent club. In fact, controlling for ability, one more year of contract duration on
average increases a player's annual wage by 24 percent.
The role of contracts as rent seeking devices has been stressed in the economic litera-
ture since Diamond and Maskin (1979) who analyze a search model where parties contract
with each other but continue to search for better matches. They show that there is an
incentive to stipulate high damages in the initial contract as this will increase the payo
in the new partnership. As they note, "the rationale for these contracts is solely to 'milk'
future partners for damage payments".
Aghion and Bolton (1987) stress the close relationship between breach penalties, con-
tract durations and an entrant's \waiting" costs, as the penalty determines the eective
duration of a contract. They show how excessive breach penalties tend to deter ecient
market entry.4 However, as pointed out by Spier and Whinston (1995), these inecient
entry decisions are driven by the absence of renegotiation, and they show that ex post
eciency can be restored once renegotiation is possible. Similarly, Posner, Triantis, and
Triantis (2004) analyze the role of non-compete clauses in labor contracts which disallows
workers to work for certain alternative employers. Again, the ineciencies caused depend
on whether or not renegotiation is permitted.5
Our framework is in-between these two polar cases: we do allow for renegotiation, and
it is also ecient when it occurs. However, the likelihood of renegotiation is endogenous
and depends on the terms of the contract. Another dierence to Spier and Whinston
(1995) is that they consider renegotiation between the initial contracting parties only,
while also the entrant participates in our framework.
Furthermore, Spier and Whinston (1995) show that ineciencies of strategic con-
tracting may arise even when ex post eciency is ensured by renegotiations because the
contract terms lead to inecient levels of relation-specic investment.
Segal and Whinston (2000) analyze how the eciency properties of exclusive dealing
clauses depend on the type of investments. Also focussing on investment incentives,
4In similar vein, Chung (1992) shows that contracting parties have an incentive to choose socially
excessive damage clauses which also leads to ex post ineciencies.
5A related issue is the controversy whether parties to a contract are able to commit not to renegotiate
(see e.g. Hart and Moore, 1999; Maskin and Tirole, 1999). Carbonell-Nicolau and Comin (2005) design
and implement an empirical test which, using data from the Spanish soccer league, leads them to reject
the commitment hypothesis.
4Feess and Muehlheusser (2003) compare the impact of dierent legal regimes in European
professional soccer on clubs' incentives to invest in the training of young players. While
long-term contracts are also jointly benecial for the contracting parties in renegotiation,
allocative ineciencies are not taken into account.
2 The model
Consider a player whose total career horizon lasts from date 0 until date 1. The game
starts at date  3 when this player bargains with his club i (the incumbent) over a contract
stipulating a duration T and a wage W per unit of time. The player's productivity in
club i is Y > 0 per unit of time.6
At date  2, after the contract has been signed but before the player starts playing
for club i at date 0, a new club e (the entrant) may be interested in hiring him. The
player's productivity in club e is Y + 
 per unit of time where 
 is a random variable
distributed on [ 1;1] with density f(
). However, to nd out the true value of 
, club
e must make an investment decision I 2 f0;1g.7 The investment cost z is club e's private
information, and from the viewpoint of club i and the player at the contracting stage,
it is distributed on [0;1] with density h(z). As in Aghion and Bolton (1987), assuming
private information with respect to a cost parameter of the entrant is a convenient way
of modeling the basic idea that rent-seeking motives might lead to unwarranted and
inecient entry deterrence.8
After the investment decision, club e decides whether or not to start a renegotiation
process with the contracting parties which takes place at date -1. We assume that the
expected value of 
 is negative which ensures that club e will never do so without having
invested.9 As our focus is on ineciencies created through strategic contracting even
6As is standard in the literature, this productivity is meant to capture the marginal revenue that can
be attributed to a player such as, for example, increases in TV money, merchandizing sales or premia
from international competitions.
7For instance, it may need to collect information about the player himself, it must gure out how well
he ts in its tactical system, or it must decide about alternative candidates.
8This assumption is not crucial for our analysis; all we need is that, at the date of contracting, the
contracting parties are facing some uncertainty concerning future entrants' willingness to hire the player.
9A similar assumption is made in Aghion and Tirole (1997) in the context of taking uninformed
investment decisions with respect to projects of unknown protability.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events
when renegotiations are ex post ecient, we furthermore assume that 
 becomes common
knowledge in the renegotiation process.
In line with the literature, we assume throughout that at each stage, multi-party
decisions are taken cooperatively by all parties involved at that stage, while (single-party)
investment decisions are individually optimal:10 That is, the contract signed at date -3
maximizes the expected joint surplus of the player and club i, while at date  2, club
e will invest whenever the cost (z) is lower than its own expected renegotiation payo.
Finally at date -1, given that club e has invested and triggered the renegotiation process,
the player is transferred whenever it is ecient to do so (i.e. when 
  0), regardless of
his contractual situation. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1.
Two additional remarks are in order with respect to our assumption that 
 is learned
before date 0, so that the player will play for one club only throughout his total career
horizon.
First, while not uncommon in US sports, this is not a typical pattern in European
soccer where most players play for several clubs. However, we wanted to follow as closely
as possible the literature on strategic contracting where trade occurs only after the arrival
of new potential trading partners. Moreover, our results can also be derived in an ex-
tended framework where productivity shocks can occur at any time and where the player
might thus play for multiple clubs.
Second, when the player is transferred, the remaining duration of his contract with
10As for our context, see e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1987), Spier and Whinston (1995) and Segal and
Whinston (2000). Moreover, also in the broader context of incomplete contracting models, canonicals
frameworks such as Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) exhibit this feature.
6club i coincides with the total contract duration T agreed upon. While convenient from
a modeling point of view, in the empirical part we need to distinguish carefully between
these two variables.
2.1 Benchmark
As for the ecient investment decision, a transfer takes place if and only if club e invests
and learns that 
  0. Therefore, expected social welfare SW(I) is given by
SW(I) =
8
> > > <
> > > :






   z if I = 1 : (1)
Without investment, the player will play for club i with productivity Y throughout his
whole career. With investment, a transfer takes place when 
  0, so that his productivity
is Y for all 
  0 and Y + 






such that it is ecient for club e to invest for all z  e zf.
2.2 Date -1: Renegotiation
Assume that club e has invested at cost z and has learned that 
  0. Then, a change
of clubs takes place, and the division of the renegotiation surplus 
 per unit of time
depends on each party's veto power. Consistent with the legal environment in European
professional soccer since 1995, club i can credibly threaten to veto the transfer as long
as the player has a valid contract, but it has no more veto power after the contract has
expired.11 Hence, there is nothing like a reserve clause as known in US sports, and long
term contracts are in fact binding.12
To capture this crucial aspect, we use the Shapley value concept to determine the
surplus division at each point in time, such that all three parties are involved as long
as the player's contract is still valid (from date 0 until date T), while club i becomes
11This legal regime was implemented by the so-called \Bosman judgment" of the European Court of
Justice in 1995, see Court of Justice of the European Communities, Case C-415/93. The data used in
the empirical part are all taken from this period.
12One might argue that players can reduce the incumbent club's veto power simply by threatening
not to perform well on the pitch. However, all we need is the realistic assumption that holding a valid
contract with a player increases a club's veto power in the renegotiation process.
7irrelevant after it has expired (for the remaining period 1   T) so that bargaining then
occurs between the player and club e only.
Denoting by c
j(
;W)  0 the renegotiation payo of party j = i;e;p per unit of time
depending on whether the player has a valid contract with club i or not, c = V;N, we
get the following result (see Appendix A for details):
Lemma 1 Using the Shapley value concept, the renegotiation payos per unit of time
are as follows:
(i) For the period [0;T] where the player's contract is still valid:

V

















(ii) For the period [T;1] where the player's contract has expired:

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i = 0 as club i benets from its veto power as long as the contract
is still valid. Since club i becomes irrelevant after the contract has expired, club e and
the player then each reap half of the renegotiation surplus.13 Note carefully, however,
that the player may nevertheless benet from a valid contract when his wage in club i is
suciently high as N
p > V




Total renegotiation payos over time are given by simply adding up over the periods
with and without valid contract:
j(
;T;W) = T  
V
j (
;W) + (1   T)  
N
j (
;W) 8j = i;e;p. (2)
Result 1 Total renegotiation payos have the following properties:
13These features emerge naturally also for alternative specications of the renegotiation process; see
e.g. Segal and Whinston (2000), Burguet, Caminal, and Matutes (2002), Feess and Muehlheusser (2003)
and Tervi o (2006).
14Note that this feature of the Shapley value is quite intuitive in our context. For instance, assume
that Y = 100 and 
 = 50 so that the player gets 75 per unit of time for period (1 T) where his contract
has expired. Hence, whenever W > 75, he will clearly get more than 75 in renegotiations as long as his
contract is valid; otherwise he would prefer to veto the transfer. Clearly, for smaller values of W, the
opposite might hold so that the player benets from being out of contract.
8(i) with respect to the player's wage in club i (W), it is (weakly) decreasing for club i,
neutral for club e, and (weakly) increasing for the player. The joint of renegotiation
payo of the player and club i is independent of W.
(ii) with respect to the remaining contract duration (T), it is increasing for club i, de-
creasing for club e, and ambiguous for the player. The joint of renegotiation payo
of the player and club i is increasing in T.
All properties follows directly from Lemma 1. The player's wage in club i increases
his payo when staying with club i, and this also increases his payo when a change of
club occurs. The opposite holds for club i. As these two eects oset each other, W is
neutral for their joint renegotiation payo and thus also for club e. This is an important
result as it ensures that W is a purely distributive matter and hence not in
uenced by
strategic considerations on rent seeking.
The crucial point in part (ii) is that, even in cases where when the player's payo
alone is decreasing in T, the joint payo of the player and club i is always increasing in
T. This follows simply from the fact that club e's payo is decreasing in T.15
Of course, in our context the renegotiation payos of club i and the player can be
naturally interpreted as the transfer fee and the player's annual wage in club e, respec-
tively.16
2.3 Date  2: Investment
Given the outcome of the renegotiation process, club e will invest whenever its expected
renegotiation payo net of investment costs z is non-negative. It follows that there exists





 such that the investment occurs for all z  e z(T).










 < 0: (3)
Finally, since e(
;T) < 
 for all 
  0, it follows that e z(T) < e zf for all T  0.
As a result, compared to the eciency benchmark, there is under-investment even for
15To see this, simply note that p() + i()  
   e(), and @e
@T < 0 8T;
.
16Since the player's career horizon is normalized to one, his total renegotiation payo equals his
\average" renegotiation payo per unit of time.
9T = 0, because club e bears the full cost of the investment (z), but gets only part of the
social gain in case of a transfer (
). And as e z0(T) < 0, the under-investment problem is
aggravated by longer contract durations.
From the viewpoint of the contracting parties who do not observe z, the probability
of a transfer is then given by Pr(z  e z(T))  Pr(
  0) which is, again due to e z0(T) < 0,
also strictly decreasing in T. We summarize as follows:
Result 2 The probability that the player will be transferred is decreasing in the remaining
duration of his contract.
2.4 Date  3: Contracting
The duration of the contract agreed upon by the player and club i maximizes their
expected joint payo:










The player and club i get at least Y with certainty. When a transfer takes place
(i.e. when club e invests and when 
 > 0), then in addition they get the total renegoti-
ation surplus 
 minus club e's share of it. Recall that club e's (renegotiation) payo is
independent of W, so that W does also not enter J(T).
If interior, the optimal contract duration T  trades o at the margin the expected
costs from increasing the contract duration because of a lower transfer probability versus
the expected gain from rent seeking in case a transfer occurs. Note again that the contract
duration can be interpreted as a breach penalty in the framework of Aghion and Bolton
(1987) as it in
uences the contracting parties' decisions and payos in a similar way: the
higher the breach penalty (or the longer the contract duration), the lower is the entrant's
prot when entry occurs (rent-seeking), but the probability of entry is ineciently low.
In our model, we focus on the rent seeking motive when determining the contract
duration. In reality, however, there are also other factors in
uencing the contract length
with diering impacts across players and clubs. For example, short term contracts may be
superior when the incumbent club is planning to hire a new coach who prefers a dierent
tactical system. Moreover, contract durations may also be driven by risk preferences
or by the private information of players about their expected future productivity. For
10similar reasons, contracts may be extended or renewed before expiry and before another
club attempts to hire the player.
Summing up, there are many reasons why the optimal contract duration varies from
case to case, and we will hence observe dierent durations for reasons beyond the rent
seeking motive. We do not want to model these dierent motives explicitly, but it is
interesting to see how changes in the contract duration aect the player's wage W in
club i. As for this, let us assume that W is determined such that the total expected
joint surplus under the optimal contract J(T ) is shared equally between the contracting
parties.17 Delegating the formal analysis to Appendix B, we get the following result:
Result 3 When an increase in the contract duration decreases the expected renegotiation
payo for the player or increases it by less than for club i, the player gets compensated
by a higher wage W.
The intuition for the result is straightforward, but it has important consequences for
the empirical part. Assuming that the division of the player's and club i's expected joint
surplus in the whole game is driven by their relative bargaining positions at the contract-
ing stage, it is clear that the party who benets more from a longer contract duration in
the renegotiation process must compensate the other party ex ante. In Appendix B, we
show that the outcome depends on the interplay of three eects, and that it is in princi-
ple possible that the player must compensate the incumbent club. However, the reverse
case where the player is compensated seems much more intuitive and is also supported
by the empirical analysis below: Recall that in renegotiations, club i clearly benets
from a longer (remaining) contract duration, while the eect on the player is ambiguous.
Therefore, for compensation of club i to occur, the eect on the player's renegotiation
payo would have to be strongly positive, which is neither intuitive nor supported by our
empirical analysis.
3 Data
Our data set covers four consecutive seasons in the German top professional soccer league
("Bundesliga") from 1996/97 to 1999/2000. Using the leading German soccer magazine
17Our argument does not depend on the 50:50 split, but holds whenever the wage is determined by
the relative bargaining power of the player and club i the contracting stage.
11\Kicker", we have compiled a data set with detailed information on contract durations,
player remuneration and transfer fees. In total there are 415 players with at least one
contract observation, and we will refer to the rst observation per player in our data set
as rst contract.18 Furthermore, in 128 out of these 415 cases, a second contract is signed
during the observation period, with 66 renewals and 62 in the course of a transfer. For
these players, we have the necessary information about the previous (i.e. rst) contracts
and new (i.e. second) contracts, and these 62 transfers will therefore be used for the
analysis of the renegotiation game. Furthermore, the information about the previous
contract will turn out to be useful when dealing with selection issues.
At the end of each season, a player either (i) changes clubs, (ii) re-signs with his
current club, or (iii) does not change his contractual status. To capture this third possi-
bility, we generated one observation for each year where no change occurred. As control
variables, we use team characteristics such as the yearly budget and nal league position
in the previous season as well as player characteristics such as position and the num-
ber of league resp. international games. Player performance in the previous season is
measured by a dummy variable indicating whether a player performed better than the
average player on his position. This dummy is based on a composite index considering
both position-specic factors such as the number of assists per match for a striker, and
team specic factors as the result of a match.
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables for the 62 transfers used in the
empirical analysis and for the other two possibilities for comparability reasons. Overall,
the proportion of club changes is 9% which can be interpreted as the probability of a club
change.
Note rst that, compared to the annual wage under the previous contract, a new
contract is on average associated with an increase of about 50%, and this holds for both,
transfers and renewals with the old club. Second, these players have higher average wages
than players who do not change their contracts. This suggests that high ability players
have a higher probability of changing their contract, which is also reinforced by the higher
number of international games, the higher percentage of players who performed above
average in the previous season, and a higher number of league games played.19
18In 253 cases, these rst contracts were signed following a transfer, while in the remaining 162 cases,
players renewed their contract with their current clubs.
19Furthermore, while not shown in the table, the mean wage in the new club is twice as large for
12  
  Club change  Renew contract  No change 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
            
wage  (in  million) 62  1.626 1.312  67  1.662 1.317  565  0.938 0.851 
            
fee (in million)  52  2.664  3.520   -   -  
              
joint = wage + fee 
(in  million)  52  4.205  4.629   -   -  
             
contract duration  
(in  years)  62 2.94 0.96  67  3.09 1.19 565 3.25 0.94 
            
remaining contract 
duration (in years)  62  1.49  1.22  67  1.38  1.13  565  1.92  0.94 
            
zero remaining 
contract duration  62  0.27    67  0.22    565  0   
            
league games  62  132.03  99.97  67  152.61 112.56 565  101.22  101.57
            
international 
games    62  18.61 27.47  67  22.12 28.92  565  11.30 19.78 
            
Budget (in 
million)  62  43.05 15.76  67  44.78 13.58  565  36.51 10.88 
            
wage previous 
contract (in 
million)  62  1.118 0.943  67  1.175 1.119  565  0.938 0.851 
            
performed above 
average last 
season  62  0.50   67  0.42  565  0.27  
              
final league 
position last 
season  (1-18)  62 9.48 5.05  67  7.55 4.81 565 8.26 4.97 
            
Sample  proportion  0.09     0.10    0.81    
All monetary variables are measured in German Marks (DM), where 1DM ≈ 0.5 Euro ≈ 0.65 US $. 
There are 10 cases with missing observations for the transfer fee.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
134 Results
4.1 Transfer probability
For all of our hypotheses concerning wages and transfer fees, we need to take into account
that players who are transferred may systematically dier from those who are not. As
explained above, at the end of each season, players either change clubs, re-sign with
their current clubs, or do not change their contracts, and we model this decision as a
multinomial logit model with three outcomes. Based on the estimates of the multinomial
model, we compute selection correction terms which are included correspondingly in the
outcome equations for wages and transfer fees. This extension of the standard selection
model has rst been proposed by Lee (1983) and was further developed by Dubin and
McFadden (1984) and Dahl (2002). Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) carry
out a Monte Carlo analysis of these estimators and some extensions of them. Based on
their ndings for small samples, we use a generalization of the Dubin and McFadden
estimator. More details are provided in Appendix C.
Note that we must deviate from the chronological order of the theory part because
the multinomial logit model is also needed to correct for a potential selection bias when
testing our hypotheses. We hence start by testing our theoretical result about the transfer
probability:
Hypothesis 1 A player's transfer probability is decreasing in the remaining duration of
his contract.
Table 2 presents the estimated marginal eects of the variables that have signicant
coecients in the multinomial logit estimation.20 These marginal eects measure the ex-
pected change in the transfer probability when the corresponding variable increases. The
transfer probability decreases by approximately 3 percentage-points per year of remain-
ing contract duration. As the overall transfer probability is only 9 percent, this means
that each additional remaining contract year reduces the transfer probability by about
one third, and thus has a considerable impact. Furthermore, the transfer probability is
players with positive remaining contract duration compared to players whose contracts were expired.
This suggests that only high ability players are likely to change clubs when having valid contracts,
whereas low ability players are transferred mainly after their contracts have expired.
20The multinomial logit estimation results are presented in table 6 in Appendix C.
14 (1) 
 Change  club 
  




   





final league position last season  0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Only significant marginal effects are shown.    
Evaluated at sample means based on estimates shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 2: Transfer probability, marginal eects
signicantly higher for players who performed above average which conrms the basic
intuition that new clubs are more willing to initiate a renegotiation process for high po-
tential players. Finally, players are less likely to be transferred when their club performed
well during the last season (i.e. had a lower rank position).
4.2 Transfer fees
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the renegotiation payos. Starting with transfer
fees, our theory leads to the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Transfer fees are (i) increasing in the remaining duration of a player's
previous contract, and (ii) decreasing in the player's wage in his previous club.
Of course, transfer fees are zero for expired contracts as the initial club no longer
plays an active role in the renegotiation process. In fact, in our data, the relationship
between remaining contract duration and transfer fee is deterministic in these cases. We
therefore restrict the analysis to the 36 cases with positive remaining contract durations.
The dependent variable is the log of the transfer fee, and as controls we use the
number of league resp. international games, and the budget of the new club. The
exclusion restrictions for the selection model are imposed by not using tenure in the old
club, above average performance in the past season, and nal league position in the past
15 
 (1)  (2) 
  Selection Model  OLS 
    
remaining duration previous 
contract  0.783*** 0.460*** 
  (0.163) (0.122) 
wage previous contract (ln)  -0.0158  0.154 
 (0.183)  (0.183) 
league games  -0.00281  -0.000516 
 (0.00258)  (0.00152) 
international games  0.0502***  0.0572*** 
 (0.0148)  (0.0157) 
international games squared  -0.000589***  -0.000591*** 
 (0.000188)  (0.000192) 
budget 0.0170**  0.0186** 
 (0.00614)  (0.00698) 
1 () λ Γ   -0.579**  
 (0.220)   
2 () λ Γ   -5.529**  
 (2.232)   
3 () λ Γ   -3.634  
 (3.906)   
Constant 9.396**  10.35*** 
 (4.541)  (2.454) 
Observations 36  36 
R-squared 0.751  0.638 
 
Dependent variable: ln(fee) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Column (1) displays the estimates of the selection model. The estimation results of the selection 
 multinomial logit are presented in the appendix (table 6). Column (2) displays the OLS estimates  
based on all contracts signed after the first contract. Only observations with strictly positive  
remaining contract duration are used because a zero remaining duration perfectly predicts a zero  
transfer fee. 
 
Table 3: Transfer fees
16season in the ln(fee) regression.21
Both regressions show a highly positive signicant impact of the remaining contract
duration. As the signicance of two of the selection terms indicates that the OLS es-
timates are biased, we rely on the selection model which estimates a coecient of ap-
proximately 0.8. This implies that each additional year of remaining contract duration
increases the transfer fee by 120 per cent.This conrms part (i) of Hypothesis 2. 22
The wage in the previous contract has no signicant impact on transfer fees which,
at rst glance, contradicts part (ii) of Hypothesis 2. However, the wage in the previous
contract is also a good proxy for the players' quality so that the insignicance of the
previous wage can be attributed to the following countervailing eects: On the one hand,
higher previous wages weaken the bargaining position of the incumbent club, thereby
reducing the transfer fee as suggested in our model. But on the other hand, players with
higher previous wages are of higher quality which ceteris paribus increases transfer fees.
4.3 Wages
Before presenting the estimation results for wages, we need to deal with a methodological
issue which did not arise when considering transfer fees. The reason is that a player's
wage in his new club is driven by the terms of two dierent contracts: First, as shown
in Result 1 above, the remaining duration and the wage of the player's previous contract
aect the wage in the new club via the renegotiation process. Again, relying on players'
second contracts only ensures availability of this information from their rst contracts,
thereby also allowing to better control for selection eects.
Second, the actual duration of his contract in the new club will again be driven by
a rent seeking motive vis a vis future entrants. While we do not explicitly model this
additional contracting stage in the theoretical part, it is clear that our model applies.
Again, when deciding on the contract duration, the contracting parties (now the player
and club e instead of club i) are facing the same trade-o between transfer probability
and joint renegotiation payo. Therefore, the player's wage in his new club will follow the
same logic so that our estimations can also be used to address the issue of compensation.
21While not a formal test the fact that none of these variables is signicant in an OLS regression
suggests that the exclusion restrictions are satised.
22The exact computation for the percentage increase is given by 100  (exp()   1)).
17In considering these two questions, we start with analyzing the impact of the previous
contract terms on the player's renegotiation payo, while the issue of compensation is
discussed in subsection 4.5 below.
Recall from Result that a higher previous wage should increase a player's new wage,
whereas the impact of the remaining duration in the previous contract turned out to be
ambiguous due to countervailing eects. We thus test the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 A player's annual wage in his new club is increasing in his annual wage
in his previous club.
The results in Table 4 conrm Hypothesis 3 by showing that wages in previous con-
tracts have a highly signicant and positive impact on new wages. This is true for all
estimated specications. Again, we are aware that we might not be able to fully control
for the players' quality with other control variables, so that the strong impact may partly
be due to quality aects expressed by higher wages in the old club. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to attribute at least part of the eect to the renegotiation channel as this is
perfectly consistent with our ndings: The previous wage is highly signicant for new
wages but insignicant for transfer fees. If the impact of previous wages were driven by
quality eects alone, then it should also have a signicant (positive) eect on transfer
fees.
Interestingly, the remaining contract length has no signicant impact on the wage
in the new contract which holds regardless of whether we exclude players with expired
contracts or not. This result supports our theoretical nding that there are countervailing
eects: on the one hand, new clubs need to pay large transfer fees when the remaining
contract duration is high, and they are not willing to pay large transfer fees and high
wages. But on the other hand, players may be worse o after contract expiration when
their wage in the incumbent club is suciently high (see Part (ii) of Result 1).
4.4 Joint renegotiation payo
While the eect of the remaining duration of a player's old contract on his wage in the
new wage alone is ambiguous, our theoretical framework suggests that long term contracts
may serve as rent seeking devices which leads to a clear prediction concerning the joint
renegotiation payo of incumbent clubs and players:
18  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Selection 
Model 
Selection 
Model  OLS OLS 
      
remaining duration previous 
contract  0.0348 0.0188 0.0734 0.0504 
 (0.105)  (0.140)  (0.0578)  (0.0876) 
wage  previous  contract  (ln)  0.413*** 0.458*** 0.392*** 0.471*** 
  (0.0966) (0.114) (0.0913) (0.113) 
contract  duration  0.245*** 0.177 0.215*** 0.137 
  (0.0916) (0.130) (0.0795) (0.116) 
league  games  0.00157* 0.00190  0.00117 0.000692 
 (0.00085) (0.00145) (0.00071) (0.00103) 
international  games  0.00667 0.00676 0.00517 0.00828 
 (0.00797) (0.00913) (0.00729) (0.00877) 
international games squared  -3.44e-05 -4.57e-05 -2.34e-05 -6.04e-05 
 (8.51e-05) (9.47e-05) (8.22e-05) (9.45e-05) 
budget  0.017*** 0.0124** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (0.00413) (0.00470) (0.00412) (0.00469) 
1 () λ Γ   -0.200 -0.253     
 (0.138)  (0.157)     
2 () λ Γ   -0.307 -1.254     
 (1.237)  (1.553)     
3 () λ Γ   -2.313 -4.468*     
 (1.610)  (2.348)     
Constant 5.024**  2.841  6.987***  6.425*** 
  (1.983) (2.464) (1.220) (1.479) 
Observations  62 45 62 45 
R-squared  0.654 0.616 0.634 0.574 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wage) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns (1) and (2) display the estimates of the selection model. Column (1) is based on all obser- 
vations, column (2) is based on observation with strictly positive remaining contract duration only.  
The estimation results of the selection multinomial logit are presented in the appendix. Columns (3)  
and (4) are OLS estimates based on the same data selection rule as in columns (1) and (2). 
 
  Table 4: Wages
19Hypothesis 4 The joint renegotiation payo of the incumbent club and a player (transfer
fee plus wage in new club) is increasing in the remaining duration of player's previous
contract.
Again, we report results for the selection model and for OLS regressions using the
same sample selections as in the analysis of wages.23
Again, in columns (1) and (3), we consider all transfers, i.e. also those following
expired contracts. In these cases, the joint renegotiation payo is just the wage because
transfer fees are zero. In columns (2) and (4) attention is conned to those cases where
the remaining contract duration was positive. Given that some of the selection correction
terms are signicant, we suspect that the OLS estimates in columns (3) and (4) are biased
and we hence rely on the selection models where the eect of the remaining contract
duration is signicantly positive and almost identical for the samples with and without
expired contracts: on average, one more year of remaining contract duration increases
the joint renegotiation payo of the contracting parties by more than 50 per cent.
4.5 Compensation
As for the issue of compensation, recall from the theoretical part (Result 3) that when
clubs benet more than players from long term contracts in renegotiation s, players will
be compensated ex ante through higher wages. According to the empirical evidence pre-
sented so far, clubs indeed seem to strongly benet from long term contracts as remaining
contract durations have a highly signicant positive impact on transfer fees, while there
is no signicant impact on wages. Based on our compensation argument, this leads to
the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 A player's wage in his current club is increasing in the duration of his
contract.
Resorting again to table 4 shows that the contract duration has a signicant positive
eect on the wage when all second contracts are used (columns 1 and 3). When we use
the subsample with strictly positive remaining contract durations only (columns 2 and 4),
the eects go in the right direction, but are insignicant which may be due to the smaller
23Note that sample sizes are dierent because there are several missing observations for transfer fees.
20  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Selection 
Model 
Selection 
Model  OLS OLS 
        
remaining duration previous 
contract  0.454*** 0.471*** 0.423***  0.212 
  (0.128)  (0.162) (0.0781) (0.129) 
wage previous contract (ln)  0.256**  0.164  0.237*  0.230 
 (0.123)  (0.136)  (0.123)  (0.142) 
contract duration  0.234**  0.0519  0.194*  0.156 
 (0.114)  (0.158)  (0.108)  (0.175) 
league games  0.00102  -0.000956  0.000745  2.24e-05 
 (0.00106)  (0.00205)  (0.000907) (0.00123) 
international games  0.0299***  0.0367***  0.0327***  0.0443*** 
  (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0115) 
international games squared  -0.00028** -0.0004*** -0.00032** -0.0005*** 
 (0.000131) (0.000139) (0.000140) (0.000141) 
budget 0.0204***  0.0169***  0.0218***  0.0178*** 
  (0.00475) (0.00450) (0.00512) (0.00515) 
1 () λ Γ   -0.522*** -0.479***     
 (0.166)  (0.161)     
2 () λ Γ   -1.614 -4.119**     
 (1.552)  (1.657)     
3 () λ Γ   -4.854** -4.534     
 (1.894)  (2.861)     
Constant 5.220**  7.111**  9.011***  9.947*** 
 (2.429)  (3.319)  (1.630)  (1.813) 
Observations 52  36  52  36 
R-squared  0.825 0.800 0.780 0.705 
 
Dependent variable: ln(joint) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns (1) and (2) display the estimates of the selection model. Column (1) is based on all observations, 
 column (2) is based on observation with strictly positive remaining contract duration only. The estimation  
results of the selection multinomial logit are presented in the appendix. Columns (3) and (4) are OLS  
estimates based on the same data selection rule as in columns (1) and (2). 
 
Table 5: Joint renegotiation payo
21sample size. Note however that, for testing Hypothesis 4, there is no need to exclude
players with expired previous contracts as the impact of current contract durations on
current wages should be independent of the terms of the previous contract.
An important point is the potential endogeneity of the contract duration. At the end
of the theoretical model, we have pointed out that the contract length is in
uenced by
factors that are unobservable in our data set such as the relative degree of risk aversion
between players and clubs or the informational environment. As these factors may well
be correlated with the error term, the contract duration may be endogenous. We test for
endogeneity by using a regression-based version of the Hausman test.24 We use the total
duration of the previous contract and the quality indicator \above average performance in
the last season" as instruments for the actual contract duration. As detailed in Appendix
D (table 7), the validity of these two instruments cannot be rejected by the Sargan
overidentifying test. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of contract duration, however,
cannot be rejected by the Hausman test. Therefore, we treat contract duration as an
exogenous variable.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a framework in the context of European soccer to test some of the
central hypotheses on the issue of strategic contracting. Using a data set from the German
\Bundesliga", we show that contract durations are useful rent seeking devices vis a vis
non-contracting parties. All in all, the empirical analysis broadly supports our model
predictions according to which the terms of a contract have both, allocative (likelihood
of transfers) and distributional (transfer fees, wages) eects, thereby also providing rst
empirical evidence for analogous predictions derived in the more general buyer-seller
frameworks in previous research on strategic contracting.
An important point we wish to address is how to interpret our nding that longer
(remaining) contract durations reduce the transfer probability. In our theory, a lower
transfer probability clearly reduces allocative eciency, and contracting parties deliber-
ately accept such ineciencies to extract rents from third parties. In the empirical part,
however, we can only test for the impact of remaining contract durations on transfer
24See, e.g. Wooldridge (2002, p. 119),
22probabilities, but clearly we can neither measure the eciency gain of a realized transfer
nor the eciency loss of a deferred transfer.25 Hence, there is no hope to establish a
causal link from contract durations to allocative eciency in the empirical part.
Nevertheless, we believe that our ndings support the view that long-term contracts
do lead to allocative ineciencies in our context, and we provide two arguments: First,
let us assume for the moment that the causation indeed goes from remaining contract
duration to transfer probability. In this case, we can safely argue that allocative e-
ciency is monotone increasing in the number of transfers as ineciencies only arise from
deterred (ecient) transfers, but not from actual (inecient) ones. Note that the lat-
ter type of transfer would imply that, in renegotiations, all parties involved agree on a
transfer even though it is known that the player is less valuable in the new club, which
seems implausible. In addition, it would lead to a potentially benecial role of long-term
contracts and other rent seeking devices in deterring inecient entry which would clearly
run completely against the spirit of all existing literature on this issue.
Second, when not assuming a causal link from remaining contract duration to trans-
fer probability, one would then have to nd an alternative theory to explain our nding
of a strongly negative relationship between these two variables. Under the alternative
assumption that transfer probabilities are exogenous (i.e. independent of the terms of a
player's contract), this amounts to arguing why low-probability players should systemat-
ically sign longer contracts. However, it emerges clearly from our empirical analysis that
the contracting parties do benet from long term contracts in case of a transfer, which
suggests that high-probability players should sign longer contracts, resulting in a positive
relationship between contract duration and transfer probability. Of course, as discussed
in section 2.4 above, there certainly are reasons for long term contracts other than the
rent-seeking motive (e.g. risk aversion), but these motives could also not explain the
observed negative relationship. In summary, even though we cannot directly measure the
eciency of transfers themselves, we believe that our results can be interpreted in the
sense of long-term contracts inducing allocative ineciencies.
Last but not least, because the driving forces in our framework are not only relevant
25Even if we could asses a player's productivity directly by comparing his performance before and after
a transfer, this would not solve the problem as eciency must refer to a player's expected performance
when the transfer is agreed upon, and not to his actual performance which, in reality, is a random
variable.
23for contracting in the sports sector, our results might also be of interest for other contexts
where long term contracts are used: For instance, there is a recent debate in the European
Commission (EC) about how to deal with long term contracts in the electricity sector.26
On the one hand, the EC emphasizes that long term contracts might be helpful in
promoting investment incentives as rms are facing uncertainty, e.g. concerning future
legislation with respect to interstate grids. Moreover, with respect to the nal allocation,
it acknowledges that long term contracts are not necessarily fully pre-determining as
there is the possibility of \secondary trade" (see p. 183), i.e. entry by another rm
(as a result of renegotiation with the incumbent rm) which tends to improve eciency.
However, on the other hand it also emphasizes that long term contracts \...raise search
cost (transaction costs) for any player interested.... This raises barriers to entry.... Hence,
both the Court and the Commission has concluded that long-term contracts should, with
certain exceptions, be disqualied..." (see p. 183). Obviously, this latter argument is
analogous to the one made and empirically conrmed in our context.
26See European Commission, \DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry", January 10, 2007,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full report part2.pdf
24Appendix
A Derivation of Lemma 1
Using the Shapley value, the renegotiation payos per unit of time as stated in Lemma
1 are computed as follows:27
Valid contract: Division of surplus between player, club i and club e
Permutation Marginal Contribution
Club i Club e Player
i;e;p Y   W 0 W + 

i;p;e Y   W 
 W
e;i;p Y   W 0 W + 

e;p;i Y   W + 
 0 W
p;e;i Y   W + 
 0 W
p;i;e Y   W 
 W
 Payos 6Y + 2
   6W 2
 6W + 2

Shapley Value (= 1




 W + 1
3

Note that as long as the contract is valid, club i has full veto power over the player and
can unilaterally force exertion of the contract.
Contract expired: Division of surplus between player and club e only
Permutation Marginal Contribution Marginal Contribution
Club e Player
e;p 0 Y + 

p;e Y + 
 0
 Payos Y + 
 Y + 







27The Shapley value is the standard cooperative bargaining concept for N  2 players. For N = 2, it
coincides with the Nash-Bargaining solution, see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 680).
25B Derivation of Result 3
In a rst step, recall that the player earns wage W in club i only when the transfer does
not occur, which happens with probability
g(T) := 1   Pr(z  e z (T))) + Pr(z  e z (T))  Pr(
  0)
= 1   H(e z (T))(1   F(0)) > 0;
where g0(T) =  h()e z0 (T)(1   F(0)) > 0:
It follows that for any T, W  is then implicitly given as follows:
g(T)W












where the rst and second term on the LHS re
ect the player's expected wage in club
i and e, respectively. Moreover, since i()+p()  Y +
  e(), the RHS of Eqn. (5)


































To determine the derivative dW
dT , dene the LHS of Eqn. (7) as X(W ;T) so that, by






More specically, using the results for the renegotiation payos from Lemma 1, we
get
i(




) + (1   T)  0
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and it will be useful to dene the following dierences:
 := i()   p() = T  (Y   2W)  
1
2


























26Making use of these dierences and going back to Eqn. (7), we get
 
@X










=  g(T) < 0; (8)
























dT > 0 to hold, we need @X
@T < 0. Thereby, the rst term in Eqn. (9) is
positive, while the sign of the bracket term is ambiguous and depends on the signs of T
and  (which are both ambiguous as well) and the properties of the distribution H().
Intuitively, whether or not the player is compensated by club i as T increases depends
on the interplay of the following three eects: First, the impact on the transfer probability
1   g(T), which is decreasing in T. Second, the dierence of the absolute renegotiation
payos () for a given T. Clearly,  becomes negative for low values of T as i(T =
0) = 0. On the other hand, as T increases,  > 0 is also possible. Third, the rate at
which the dierence of the total renegotiation payos changes as T increases (T), where
we know from Result 1 that the total renegotiation payo for club i increases in T, while
the eect is ambiguous for the player.
Result 3 then simply says that if the net eect leads to @X
@T < 0, then it is the case
that club i benets more than the player from an increase in the contract duration. Since
the total joint surplus is to be shared equally, this calls for player compensation in the
form of a higher wage.
C Selection model with multiple outcomes
C.1 Model specication




j + j (10)







w1 = x1 + u1 if y = 1 (12)
Let us denote the option club change with j = 1, hence the wage equation refers to
the wage in case of a club change. As is well known OLS of the second part will be biased
27if u1 and the j are correlated. The rst part is a latent variable model which is used to
derive the probabilities of each option. The probability of a club change is given by







Assuming an extreme value distribution for j yields the well-known logit probabilities,
e.g. for the rst option as (assuming that option 3 is the reference option)








 can be used to generate control functions that take account of the
potential correlation between u and . Denote these control functions as  j = f(b p1; b p2; b p3)
, where b pi are the estimated choice probabilities, and write the second stage as
w1 = x1 +  j + "1;
where "1 is mean-independent of x. The dierent methods discussed in Bourguignon,
Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) dier in the construction of the control functions  :The
method we use following the suggestion in Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007)
in case of small samples denes the control functions as
 3 = ln(b p3)
 i = b pi ln(b pi)=(1   b pi);i = 1;2
where we assume that choice number 3 is the reference category. The estimated
coecients b  correspond to uiu, where  is the standard deviation of u1 and iu is the
correlation coecient between u1 and i;i = 1;2;3:
28C.2 Multinomial logit estimation results
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Change club  Renew contract 
    
remaining duration at end of 
season 
-0.498*** -0.605*** 
  (0.161) (0.163) 
wage previous contract   0.358  0.338 
 (0.260)  (0.257) 
league games  0.00125  0.000611 
 (0.00165)  (0.00149) 
international  games  -0.00893  0.0176 
 (0.0155)  (0.0148) 
international  games squared  0.000112  -8.47e-05 
 (0.000173)  (0.000163) 
Tenure -0.0646  0.0751** 
 (0.0504)  (0.0354) 
performed above average last 
season 
1.240*** 0.377 
 (0.325)  (0.317) 
budget old club  -0.0130  -0.0280* 
 (0.0159)  (0.0155) 
final league position last season  0.0849**  -0.0309 
 (0.0335)  (0.0317) 
Constant -6.900**  -5.161 
 (3.253)  (3.209) 
Observations 694  694 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
“No change”of contract status serves as reference category.  Note that there are 694 
observations because, starting with the 415 first contracts in the data,  we take into account all 




Table 6: Multinomial logit of contract status at end of season
29D Endogeneity of contract duration
 
  
  2SLS 
  
remaining duration previous contract 0.00820 
  (0.0816) 
wage previous contract (ln)  0.387*** 
 (0.0962) 
contract duration  0.408** 
  (0.181) 
international games  0.00753 
 (0.00792) 







R squared  0.595 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wage) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Contract duration is instrumented with contract duration in previous 
contract and the dummy performed above average last season”. F-
test of joint significance of instruments is 7.25 with a p-value of 0.002. 
The Sargan overidentification test statistic is 0.260 with a p-value of 
0.61. The Hausman-Wu test statistic for exogeneity is 1.618 with a p-
value of 0.21. Hence the validity of the instruments and exogeneity of 
contract duration cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 7: Wages (2SLS)
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